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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
This appeal is from a final Order and Judgment finding the 
Appellant guilty of absconding, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of Section 76-8-309.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, in so far as 
Appellant was found to be an offender who absconded supervision by 
willfully changing his residence that he reported as his correct 
address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining 
permission. Appellant was found guilty of said offense following 
a jury trial. Please refer to the attached Verdict dated July 28, 
1998 (R. at 062) Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison 
on August 26, 1998 for a term of imprisonment of an indeterminate 
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STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
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STEVEN MAX ELLIOTT 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This appeal is from a final Order and Judgment finding the 
Appellant guilty of absconding, a Third Degree Felony, in violation 
of Section 76-8-309.5 U.C.A. (1953), as amended, in so far as 
Appellant was found to be an offender who absconded supervision by 
willfully changing his residence that he reported as his correct 
address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining 
permission. Appellant was found guilty of said offense following 
a jury trial. Please refer to the attached Verdict dated July 28, 
1998. (R. at 062) Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State 
Prison on August 26, 1998 for a term of imprisonment of an 
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indeterminate term of not to exceed five years in prison. (R. at 
P. 064) This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
POINT 
Did the trial Court commit reversible error 
when it failed to dismiss the charge of 
absconding, when the State failed to establish 
a primae facie case against the Appellant? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a 
case to the jury, the Court uses the same standard as for a claim 
of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict. State v. 
Dibello, 780 P. 2d 1221 (Utah 1989) In considering a claim for 
sufficiency of the evidence, the Utah Court of Appeals reviews 
evidence and all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it 
in a light most favorable to the verdict, and reverses convictions 
for insufficient evidence only when the evidence so viewed, is 
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the Defendant 
committed the crime of which he was convicted. State v. Johnson, 
821 P.2d 1150 (Utah 1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged with absconding, a Third Degree 
Felony in violation of Section 76-8-309.5, U.C.A. (1953), as 
amended, as follows: Said Defendant, "an offender", absconded 
supervision by willfully changing his residence that he reported as 
his correct address without notifying his parole officer or 
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obtaining permission. Please refer to the attached Information, 
(R. at 001), marked Appellant's Addendum #1. Appellant was 
convicted by a jury. Please refer to the Jury Verdict (R. at P. 
062), attached hereto as Appellant's Addendum #2. Subsequently on 
August 26, 1998, Appellant was sentenced to an indeterminate term 
at the Utah State Prison of not to exceed five years. Please refer 
to the attached Judgment & Conviction, attached hereto as 
Appellant's Addendum #3. 
At the close of the State's case, Appellant, through his 
public defender, moved for a directed verdict on the grounds that 
the State failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that 
Appellant had changed his residence that he reported to his parole 
officer without notifying his parole officer or obtaining 
permission. (R. at 081, P. 135) The Court denied the Motion and 
the defense rested without calling witnesses or providing a 
defense. (R. at 081, P. 136 & 137) Please refer to that portion 
of the transcript of the record, attached as Addendum #4. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appellant was released from the Utah State Prison and placed 
on parole on or about August 6, 1997. (R. at 081, P. 106 & 154) 
On or about May 20, 1998, Appellant was charged with absconding, a 
Third Degree Felony, in violation of Section 76-8-309.5, U.C.A. 
(1953), as amended as follows: 
Said Defendant, "an offender", absconded 
supervision by willfully changing his 
residence that he reported as his correct 
address without notifying his parole officer 
or obtaining permission. (R. at P. 001) 
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The matter went to trial on the above information on July 28, 
1998 before the Honorable W. Brent West of the Second Judicial 
District Court of Weber County, State of Utah. 
Appellant and Robbie Rhoades were both on parole from the Utah 
State Prison, and Appellant was being supervised by Glen 
Ercanbrack, his parole agent. (R. at 081, P. 82 & 83) Both men 
had been, friends for some years and both worked for Alex Hurtado in 
their capacities as construction workers, both interior and 
exterior, remodeling homes in January of 1998. Both men worked on 
a project located at 1462 Washington Boulevard. Mr. Rhoades was 
paid wages, while Appellant was authorized to reside in one of the 
apartments at that address in exchange for his work for Mr. 
Hurtado. (R. at 081, P. 82 & 83) During this period, Mr. Rhoades 
was living at a halfway house known as NUCCC, Ogden, Utah. (R. at 
081, P. 84) 
On or about January 9, 1998, Mr. Ercanbrack and other 
colleagues conducted a supervision review with Appellant as a 
result of dirty urine and discussed Appellant's parole requirements 
with him. Appellant was told at that time that he needed to return 
to the parole office on January 13, 1998 so that Mr. Ercanbrack 
could contact the parole office and make a decision of whether or 
not to revoke Appellant's parole as a result of Appellant's 
position that he did not pass drug treatment. (R. at 081, P. ill) 
Appellant had produced a urine sample that tested positive for the 
use of cocaine. (R. at 081, P. Ill) Appellant subsequently failed 
to report for his January 13, 1998 appointment with his parole 
4 
officer. (R. at 081, P. 112). Mr. Ercanbrack went to Appellant's 
home at 1462 Washington Boulevard, but did not find Appellant or 
his truck at that location. This visit was conducted after 
Appellant's 7:00 p.m. curfew. (R. at 081, P. 112) 
On January 15, 1998, Mr. Ercanbrack received a phone call from 
Appellant. Appellant was told to stay home, but by the time 
Ercanbrack arrived at Appellant's apartment, he was gone. 
Ercanbrack then contacted Appellant's friend, Robbie Rhoades, at 
the half way house in order to get Rhoades to tell him Appellant's 
location. (R. at 081, P. 115) Ercanbrack testified that he 
threatened to send Rhoades back to prison if he did not cooperate. 
(R. at 081. P. 128) Ercanbrack also testified that Rhoades told 
him that Appellant said he was leaving, was not coming back and to 
pack up the rest of his things. (R. at 081, P. 116) 
Soon thereafter, Ercanbrack and a colleague had the apartment 
owner, Alex Hurtado, let them into Appellant's apartment. 
Ercanbrack testified that he observed property missing, with only 
"just scattered debris in the apartment." (R. at 081, P. 116) Mr. 
Hurtado had no knowledge of the Appellant's whereabouts, but had 
not removed Appellant's remaining property and had not re-rented 
the apartment to anyone else. Among personal property remaining in 
the apartment, Ercanbrack admitted during cross-examination that 
items of clothing were present, along with a couch, a bed, end 
tables, lamps, weight bench, dishes, plates and other items 
belonging to Appellant. Ercanbrack did not bother looking in the 
refrigerator for evidence of Appellant's residence in the 
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apartment. (R. at 081, P. 134) Please see the attached copy of a 
portion of Ercanbrack's testimony during Appellant's cross-
examination, incorporated herein by reference as Appellant's 
Addendum #5. 
Following Ercanbrack's testimony, the State rested its case 
and defense counsel moved for a directed verdict. This Motion was 
denied, the case was sent to the jury and subsequently Appellant 
was found guilty of absconding and sentenced to prison. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
Did the trial Court commit reversible error 
when it failed to dismiss the charge of 
absconding, when the State failed to establish 
a primae facie case against the Appellant? 
The State did not prove that Appellant absconded supervision 
by willfully changing his residence without notifying his parole 
officer or obtaining permission to change said residence. The 
Court abused its discretion by denying Appellant's Motion for a 
Directed Verdict based upon this lack of evidence, even though the 
State failed to present a primae facie case. 
In determining whether there is sufficient evidence to send a 
case to the jury, the Court must use the same standard of review as 
a claim of insufficient evidence to support a jury verdict. State 
v. Dibello, 780 P. 2d 1221 (Utah 1989) A challenge to the 
sufficiency of the evidence presents the Defendant with a heavy 
burden. He must first marshall all the evidence supporting the 
jury's verdict and then demonstrate how this evidence was viewed in 
the most favorable light and is insufficient to support the 
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verdict. State v. Pillinv, 875 P.2d 604 (Utah App. 1994); State v. 
Sjcheel, 823 P.2d 470 (Utah App. 1991); State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 
1201 (Utah App. 1991) 
In the case at bar, very little direct evidence was presented 
to the jury nor was any direct evidence available to suggest that 
the Appellant had willfully changed his residence from that given 
to the parole officer. Appellant's parole officer, Ercanbrack, 
testified that after he became aware of Appellant's dirty urine, he 
instructed the Appellant to report back a few days later. (R. at 
081 P. Ill) There is nothing in the transcript to indicate that 
Appellant was told he was going back to prison for a parole 
violation, nor is there anything in the record to suggest that 
Appellant was not living or would not be living at his reported 
address during the interim. Just because Ercanbrack could not find 
Appellant between January 13th and January 15, 1998, does not mean 
that Appellant had changed his address. To be sure, Ercanbrack 
testified that when he gained entrance to Appellant's apartment on 
January 15, 1998, all of Appellant's property remained in the 
apartment, with the exception of a TV and a guitar. In fact, 
Appellant contacted Ercanbrack on the 15th of January to tell him 
he was going into drug treatment. There was no mention of any 
alternative residence, except for the possibility of drug 
treatment. (R. at 081, P. 118 & 119) In fact, the only evidence 
produced at trial that Appellant had willfully changed his 
residence was the fact that Ercanbrack could not locate Appellant 
personally and the testimony of an inmate from the Utah State 
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Prison that Appellant was going to leave and wanted him (Rhoades) 
to box up his things. In fact, even the landlord of Appellant's 
apartment had failed to box Appellant's property or to re-rent the 
apartment. There was no evidence of how long Appellant had leased 
the premises, whether he had paid for the rental for future weeks 
or whether he was delinquent in his rent. The trial Court allowed 
this case to go to the jury speculating on whether Appellant had 
made other arrangements for living, whether he had returned to the 
apartment for the rest of his property, whether he was living with 
someone else or even whether he had been hospitalized. As it turns 
out, Appellant was arrested in a park in Salt Lake City in March of 
1998. (R. at 081, P. 120) 
The facts presented by the State simply cannot support the 
jury verdict. In fact, there is no evidence in the record that 
Appellant intended to change his residence. He was not charged 
with failure to report to his parole officer, or even for a parole 
violation incident to the dirty urine. The State failed to prove 
that the Appellant acted with the requisite mental state acts 
required for a successful prosecution for the crime with which 
Appellant was charged. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction should be set aside and vacated and 
Appellant should be released from custody. 
DATED this / day of February, 1999. 
&ANDINE SALERNO, 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF MftHiiNG 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and 
foregoing Brief of Appellant was posted in the United States mail, 
postage prepaid on this / day of February, 1999 and addressed 
tO: 
Jan Graham 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
-^c^L •**k 
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ADDENDUM #1 
SECOND JUDICIAL ^xSTRICT COURT OF WEBER COIL.-f, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
STEVEN ELLIOT 
Defendant 
DOB -- 62/05/13 
INFORMATION 
Attorney No 98-1092F 
O.T.N. 
State of Utah 
County of Weber ss 
Count 
The undersigned complainant upon oath states that the 
complainant has reason to believe that the above named defendant between 
January 13, 1998 and March 17, 1998 in Weber County, State of Utah 
committed a 
THIRD DEGREE FELONY, TO WIT: 
ABSCONDING, 76-8-309.5, U.C.A. (1953), AS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: 
SAID DEFENDANT, "AN OFFENDER", DID ADOeUMJ J?'kUlW~A FACILITY BY ~ 
L5-AVINC MI33ieU!g--P£RMXS-SJLQii--AN^ ^ AT--A— 
-9RES-eR:^BEiy~TTME-r-^h ABSCONDED SUPERVISION BY WILLFULLY CHANGING 
HIS/HBR RESIDENCE THAT HE/fiSS REPORTED AS HIS/HSR CORRECT ADDRESS 
WITHOUT NOTIFYING HIS/HgR PAROLE OFFICER OR OBTAINING PERMISSION. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from the following witnesses 
AGENT G. ERCANBRACK 
R. ROSE 
Authorized for presentment and filing: 
MARK R. DeCARIA, 
County Attorney _____ / 
BV-./ y< ' i >: .['A \ . . ,--i \An k •/ ,/ 
J BRENDA J . BEATON, /NU ... -6^3 A 
Subscribed in my presence this 20th day of May , 1998 
4VLAG1STRATE 
Presented and filed this 20th day of May V> , 1998 
001 
ADDENDUM #2 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN ELLIOT, 
Defendant, 
VERDICT 
CASE NO: 981902358 
We, the jury impaneled to try the issues in the above-entitled matter, do hereby find 
the defendant, GUILTY ofAbsconding a third degree felony. 
DATED this 2SZay of July, 1998. 
062 ^ 
ADDENDUM #3 
SECOND DISTRICT COURT - OGDEN COURT .£:;- ? 
WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH **.*J <* C 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STEVEN ELLIOT, 
Defendant. 
MINUTES 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 981902358 FS 
Judge: W. BRENT WEST 
Date: August 26, 1998 
PRESENT 
Clerk: pama 
Prosecutor: LES DAROCZI 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney(s) : PDA, SNIDER 
Agency: Adult Probation and Par 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: May 13, 1962 
Video 
Tape Number: W82 6 Tape Count: 12:25 
CHARGES 
1. ABSCONDING - 3rd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 08/26/1998 Guilty 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ABSCONDING a 3rd Degree 
Felony, the defendant is sentenced to an indeterminate term of not 
to exceed five years in the Utah State Prison. 
To the WEBER County Sheriff: The defendant is remanded to your 
custody for transportation to the Utah State Prison where the 
defendant will be confined. 
Page 1 
064 
Case No: 981902358 
Date: Aug 26, 1998 
SENTENCE PRISON CONCURRENT/CONSECUTIVE NOTE 
The defendant to serve 0-5 years at the Utah State Prison. Time to 
run consecutive with other charges. Defendant granted credit for 
time served. 
-pi _ 
Dated this 2b day of nU&ASl 
District Court Judge 
Page 2 (last) 065 
ADDENDUM #4 
Miilti-Pagc 
Page 137 
particularly if he were going on the lam or if he 
were going to run. In fact, the less items you take 
the much easier it is to run away. 
Contrary to that, there is the evidence that 
a lot of his stuff remained, he seemed to take the 
thing most valuable to his mother's, and I can't 
remember what the second item was, there was a guitar 
and a t.v., but I don't have any evidence at this 
point other than inferentially through a question 
that you asked, what happened to the t.v., so at this 
point it's a factual issue at least sufficient to 
survive a motion for directed verdict or a motion to 
dismiss and requiring the defense to go forward if 
they intend to put on any evidence. 
MR. DAROCIZ: Thank you. 
THE COURT: So we'll take a short -- we've 
got another four minutes left, and then we'll come 
back and hear from the defense. 
MR. SNIDER: Thank you. 
(WHEREAS, THIS HEARING WENT OFF THE RECORD). 
THE COURT: You can be seated. They're 
bringing the jury back in. All right. The record 
will reflect that both the State and the Defense are 
here, Mr. Elliot is here and the jury is back in the 
box. At this point, Mr. Snider, is the defense 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
Multi-Page 
Page 136 
failed to meet their burden of proof in this case and 
put on any elements sufficient to show that Mr. 
Elliot absconded. 
The evidence is that he wasn't there when 
they showed up, the evidence is that he was in Salt 
Lake, but there's no evidence that said that he had 
never moved from thac residence. They said we didn't 
find him there when we went by, but there's no 
evidence that said he r.cved from that residence. 
THE COURT: 2kay. Mr. Darociz? 
MR. DAROCIZ: Oh, I submit it, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Z'~ going to deny the motion at 
this point. There is sufficient evidence if this 
jury were to choose :: believe certain portions of 
the testimony, they cculd make a finding that he was 
an offender, that he absconded supervision by 
willfully changing his resident that he reported as 
his correct address without notifying his Parole 
Officer and obtaining permission. 
I guess not creating any cases that aren't 
there, if they choose :c believe the testimony that 
he told his colleague chat he worked with that he was 
upset about this dircy urine and that he was leaving, 
it's also inferentially correct that he doesn't 
25 I necessarily have to cake everything with him, 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
ADDENDUM #5 
Multi-Page 
Page 134 
other page of questions. 
THE COURT: Okay. 
Q (By MR. SNIDER) Regard -- You went over 
to Mr. Elliot's apartment on the 15th; correct? 
A Yes. I did. 
Q And you said some items were missing. 
Now, Mr. Darociz in his opening statement said, and I 
wrote it down so I can make sure, "most of his things 
are gone." Now, that would be somewhat of a 
misstatement; correct? There was still a couch 
there; correct? 
A There was still a couch. Yes. 
Q A bed was there? 
A Yes . 
Q Still had clothes in the closet? 
A A few. Not as many as the other time. 
Q Still had food in the refrigerator? 
A Well, we never looked in the fridge. 
Q End tables, lamps, weight bench, dishes, 
plates, stuff like that, they were all still there? 
A Yeah. 
MR. SNIDER: Okay. No other questions. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: Mr. Darociz? 
MR. DAROCIZ: Nothing further, Your Honor. 
DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188 
ADDENDUM #6 
321 CRIMINAL CODE 76-8-309.5 
pants in an official meeting tending to interrupt its 
proceedings. 
(2) "Official meeting," as used in this section, means any 
lawful meeting of public servants for the purposes of carrying 
on governmental functions. 1992 
76-8-305. Interference wi th arrest ing officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if he has 
knowledge, or by the exercise of reasonable care should have 
knowledge, that a peace officer is seeking to effect a lawful 
arrest or detention of that person or another and interferes 
with the arrest or detention by: 
(1) use of force or any weapon; 
(2) the arrested person's refusal to perform any act 
required by lawful order: 
(a) necessary to effect the arrest or detention; and 
(b) made by a peace officer involved in the arrest or 
detention; or 
(3) the arrested person's or another person's refusal to 
refrain from performing any act that would impede the 
arrest or detention. 1990 
76-8-306. Obstruct ing just ice . 
(1) A person is guilty of an offense if, with intent to hinder, 
prevent, or delay the discovery, apprehension, prosecution, 
conviction, or punishment of another for the commission of a 
crime, he: 
(a) knowing an offense has been committed, conceals it 
from a magistrate; 
(b) harbors or conceals the offender; 
(c) provides the offender a weapon, transportation, 
disguise, or other means for avoiding discovery or appre-
hension; 
(d) warns the offender of impending discovery or ap-
prehension; 
(e) conceals, destroys, or alters any physical evidence 
that might aid in the discovery, apprehension, or convic-
tion of the person; 
(f) obstructs by force, intimidation, or deception any-
one from performing an act that might aid in the discov-
ery, apprehension, prosecution, or conviction of the per-
son; or 
(g) having knowledge tha t a law enforcement officer 
has been authorized or has applied for authorization 
under either Section 77-23a-10 or 77-23a-15 to intercept a 
wire, electronic, or oral communication, gives notice or 
at tempts to give notice of the possible interception to any 
person. 
(2) An offense under Subsections (l)(a) through (f) is a class 
B misdemeanor, unless the actor knows that the offender 
committed a capital offense or a felony of the first degree, in 
which case the offense is a second degree felony. 
(3) An offense under Subsection {Dig) is a third degree 
felony. 
(4) Subsection (l)(f) does not apply to an act against a juror. 
Obstructing the function of a juror is addressed in Section 
(5) The provisions of Section 76-8-316 shall govern an act or 
"U-eat against a judge or a member of the Board of Pardons 
^ d Parole or the judge's or member's immediate family. 1995 
7&8«307. Fai lure to aid peace officer. 
A person is guilty of a class B misdemeanor if, upon 
c
°inmand by a peace officer identifiable or identified by him as 
?U(:h, he unreasonably fails or refuses to aid the peace officer 
121
 effecting an arrest or in preventing the commission of any 
°Sense by another person. 1973 
7&8-308. Acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent 
criminal prosecut ion — Defense . 
(i) A person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor if he: 
(a) solicits, accepts, or agrees to accept any benefit as 
consideration for his refraining from initiating or aiding 
in a criminal prosecution; or 
(b) confers, offers, or agrees to confer any benefit upon 
another as consideration for the person refraining from 
initiating or aiding in a criminal prosecution. 
(2) It is an affirmative defense tha t the value of the benefit 
did not exceed an amount which the actor believed to be due as 
restitution or indemnification for the loss caused or to be 
caused by the offense. 1991 
76-8-309. Escape and aggravated escape — Consecu-
tive s entences — Definitions. 
(1) A prisoner is guilty of escape if he leaves official custody 
without authorization. 
(2) A prisoner is guilty of aggravated escape if in the 
commission of an escape he uses a dangerous weapon, as 
defined in Section 76-1-601, or causes serious bodily injury to 
another. 
(3) Aggravated escape is a first degree felony. 
(4) Escape from a state prison is a second degree felony. 
(5) Any other escape is a third degree felony. 
(6) Any prison term imposed upon a prisoner for escape 
under this section shall run consecutively with any other 
sentence. 
(7) For the purposes of this part: 
(a) "Confinement" means: 
(i) housed in a state prison or any other facility 
pursuant to a contract with the Utah Department of 
Corrections after being sentenced and committed and 
the sentence has not been terminated or voided or the 
prisoner is not on parole; 
(ii) lawfully detained in a county jail prior to trial 
or sentencing or housed in a county jail after sentenc-
ing and commitment and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole; 
or 
(iii) lawfully detained following arrest. 
(b) "Official custody" means arrest, whether with or 
without warrant , or confinement in a state prison, jail, 
institution for secure confinement of juvenile offenders, or 
any confinement pursuant to an order of the court or 
sentenced and committed and the sentence has not been 
terminated or voided or the prisoner is not on parole. A 
person is considered confined in the state prison if he: 
(i) without authority fails to return to his place of 
confinement from work release or home visit by the 
time designated for return; 
(ii) is in prehearing custody after arrest for parole 
violation; 
(iii) is being housed in a county jail, after felony 
commitment, pursuant to a contract with the Depart-
ment of Corrections; or 
(iv) is being transported as a prisoner in the state 
prison by correctional officers. 
(c) "Prisoner" means any person who is in official cus-
tody and includes persons under trustee status. 1997 
76-8-309.5. Absconding. 
(1) An offender absconds from a facility when he: 
(a) leaves the facility without permission; or 
(b) fails to re turn at a prescribed time. 
(2) An offender absconds from supervision when he will-
fully changes the residence that he reported as his correct 
address without notifying his parole officer or obtaining per-
mission. 
(3) Absconding is a third degree felony. 
(4) For the purposes of this section: 
(a) "Facility" means a residential facility owned, oper-
ated, leased, or contracted by the Department of Correc-
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tions or a county to provide housmg, programming, or 
t reatment of individuals who have been placed on parole 
(b) "Offender" means a person who has been convicted 
of a crime and has been 
d) sent to a facility, 
(11) placed on parole under condition that he report 
to a parole officer on a regular basis or that he serve 
periods of confinement during his parole period or 
that he attend classes or t reatment as a condition of 
parole, or 
(m) released for a period during confinement for 
work, school, treatment, or other temporary 
nonconfinement purposes 1997 
76-8-310. Aiding escape — Penalt ies . 
( D A person is guilty of aiding escape if 
(a) the person aids another person to escape from 
official custody as defined in Section 76-8-309, or 
(b) the person knowingly provides a person in official 
custody with an item which may facilitate the escape of 
such person, or 
(c) being a person in official custody, the person know-
ingly procures, makes, or possesses an item which may 
facilitate escape 
(2) An offense under this section is a second degree felony if 
(a) the actor is a public servant whose duty is to detain 
persons arrested for offenses or convictions of crime who 
knowingly facilitates, aids, or permits an escape from 
official custody, or 
(b) the person provides a dangerous weapon, as defined 
in Section 76-1-601, to facilitate the escape, or 
(c) the person causes serious bodily injury to another to 
aid the escape 
(3) Any other offense under this section is a third degree 
felony 1997 
76-8-311. Repealed. 1990 
76-8-311.1. Secure areas — Items prohibited — Pen-
alty. 
(1) In addition to the definitions in Section 76-10-501, as 
used in this section 
(a) "Correctional facility" has the same meaning as 
defined m Section 76-8-311 3 
(b) "Explosive" has the same meaning as defined for 
"explosive, chemical, or incendiary device" defined in 
Section 76-10-306 
(c) "Law enforcement facility" means a facility which is 
owned, leased, or operated by a law enforcement agency 
(d) "Mental health facility" has the same meaning as 
defined m Section 62A-12-202 
(e) (l) "Secure area" means any area into which certain 
persons are restricted from transporting any firearm, 
ammunition, dangerous weapon, or explosive 
(11) A "secure area" may not include any area 
normally accessible to the public 
(2) A person in charge of a correctional, law enforcement, or 
mental health facility may establish secure areas within the 
facility and may prohibit or control by rule any firearm, 
ammunition, dangerous weapon, or explosive 
(3) At least one notice shall be prominently displayed at 
each entrance to an area in which a firearm, ammunition, 
dangerous weapon, or explosive is restricted 
(4) Provisions shall be made to provide a secure weapons 
storage area so that persons entering the secure area may 
store their weapons prior to entering the secure area The 
entity operating the facility shall be responsible for weapons 
while they are stored in the- storage area 
(5) It is a defense to any prosecution under this section tha t 
the accused, in committing the act made criminal by this 
section, acted in conformity with the facility's rule or pohcy 
established pursuant to this section 
(6) Any person who knowingly or intentionally transports 
into a secure area of a facility any firearm, ammunition, 
dangerous weapon or explosive is guilty of a third degree 
felony 1996 
76-8-311.3. I tems prohibited in correct ional and men-
tal heal th facil it ies — Penalt ies . 
(1) As used in this section 
(a) "Contraband" means any item not specifically pro-
hibited for possession by offenders under this section or 
Title 58 Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act 
(b) "Controlled substance" means any substance de-
fined as a controlled substance under Title 58, Chapter 37, 
Utah Controlled Substances Act 
(c) "Correctional facility" means 
d) any facility operated by the Department of 
Corrections to house offenders in either a secure or 
nonsecure setting 
(n) any facility operated by a municipality or a 
county to house or detain criminal offenders, 
(m) any juvenile detention facility, and 
dv) any building or grounds appurtenant to the 
facility or lands granted to the state, municipality, or 
county for use as a correctional facility 
(d) "Medicine" means any prescription drug as defined 
in Title 58, Chapter 17a, Pharmacy Practice Act but does 
not include any controlled substances as defined in Title 
58, Chapter 37, Utah Controlled Substances Act 
(e) "Mental health facility" has the same meaning as 
defined in Section 62A-12-202 
(f) "Offender" means a person m custody at a correc-
tional facility 
(g) "Secure area" has the same meaning as provided m 
Section 76-8-311 1 
(2) Notwithstanding any other statute to the contrary, 
including Subsection 76-10-50Kb), a correctional or mental 
health facility may pro\ ide by rule that no firearm, ammuni-
tion, dangerous weapon, implement of escape, explosive, con-
trolled substance, spirituous or fermented liquor, medicine, or 
poison in any quantity may be 
(a) transported to or upon a correctional or mental 
health facility, 
(b) sold or given away at any correctional or mental 
health facility, 
(c) given to or used by any offender at a correctional or 
mental health facility, or 
(d) knowingly or intentionally possessed at a correc-
tional or mental health facility r 
(3) It is a defense to any prosecution under this section if 
the accused in committing the act made criminal by this 
section 
(a) with respect to a correctional facility operated by 
the Department of Corrections, acted in conformity with* 
departmental rule or policy, 
(b) with respect to a correctional facility operated by a 
municipality, acted in conformity with the policy of the" 
municipality, ^ 
(c) with respect to a correctional facility operated by a, 
county, acted in conformity with the policy of the county; 
or \y 
(d) with respect to a mental health facility, acted uiu 
conformity with the policy of the mental health facility -, 
(4) (a) Any person who transports to or upon a correctional^ 
facility, or into a secure area of a mental health facility, 
any firearm, ammunition, dangerous weapon, explosive,^ 
or implement of escape with intent to provide or sell it to 
any offender, is guilty of a second degree felony 
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(f) final orders and decrees of the district court review 
of informal adjudicative proceedings of agencies under 
Subsection (e); 
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of record 
holding a statute of the United States or this state 
unconstitutional on its face under the Constitution of the 
United States or the Utah Constitution; 
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in-
volving a charge of a first degree or capital felony; 
(i) appeals from the district court involving a conviction 
of a first degree or capital felony; 
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court of 
record over which the Court of Appeals does not have 
original appellate jurisdiction; and 
(k) appeals from the district court of orders, judgments, 
or decrees ruling on legislative subpoenas. 
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court of Ap-
peals any of the matters over which the Supreme Court has 
original appellate jurisdiction, except: 
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of an inter-
locutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a 
capital felony; 
(b) election and voting contests; 
(c) reapportionment of election districts; 
(d) retention or removal of public officers; 
(e) matters involving legislative subpoenas; and 
(f) those matters described in Subsections (3)(a) 
through (d). 
(5) The Supreme Court has sole discretion in granting or 
denying a petition for writ of certiorari for the review of a 
Court of Appeals adjudication, but the Supreme Court shall 
review those cases certified to it by the Court of Appeals under 
Subsection (3)(b). 
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements 
of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of agency adjudicative 
proceedings. 1996 
78-2-3. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-4. Supreme Court — Rulemaking, j u d g e s pro tem-
pore, and practice of law. 
(1) The Supreme Court shall adopt rules of procedure and 
evidence for use in the courts of the state and shall by rule 
manage the appellate process. The Legislature may amend 
the rules of procedure and evidence adopted by the Supreme 
Court upon a vote of two-thirds of all members of both nouses 
of the Legislature. 
(2) Except as otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution, 
the Supreme Court by rule may authorize retired justices and 
judges and judges pro tempore to perform any judicial duties. 
Judges pro tempore shall be citizens of the United States, 
Utah residents, and admitted to practice law in Utah. 
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the practice of 
law, including admission to practice law and the conduct and 
discipline of persons admitted to the practice of law. 1986 
78-2-5. Repealed. 1988 
78-2-6. Appellate court administrator. 
The appellate court administrator shall appoint clerks and 
support staff as necessary for the operation of the Supreme 
Court and the Court of Appeals. The duties of the clerks and 
support staff shall be established by the appellate court 
administrator, and powers established by rule of the Supreme 
Court. 1986 
78-2-7. Repealed. 1986 
78-2-7.5. Service of sheriff to court. 
The court may at any time require the attendance and 
services of any sheriff in the state. 1988 
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. Repealed. 1986,1988 
CHAPTER 2a 
COURT OF APPEALS 
Section 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdiction. 
78-2a-4. Review of actions by Supreme Court. 
78-2a-5. Location of Court of Appeals. 
78-2a-l. Creation — Seal. 
There is created a court known as the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals is a court of record and shall have a seal. 
1986 
78-2a-2. Number of judges — Terms — Functions — 
Filing fees. 
(1) The Court of Appeals consists of seven judges. The term 
of appointment to office as a judge of the Court of Appeals is 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office of a judge of the Court of Appeals is six years and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. The presiding judge of the Court of Appeals 
shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or 
fraction thereof for the period served. 
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in 
panels of three judges. Assignment to panels shall be by 
random rotation of all judges of the Court of Appeals. The 
Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a 
chair for each panel. The Court of Appeals may not sit en banc. 
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presid-
ing judge from among the members of the court by majority 
vote of all judges. The term of office of the presiding judge is 
two years and until a successor is elected. A presiding judge of 
the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than two 
successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for 
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity 
of the presiding judge. 
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of 
presiding judge by majority vote of all judges of the Court of 
Appeals. In addition to the duties of a judge of the Court of 
Appeals, the presiding judge shall: 
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels; 
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court; 
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of 
Appeals; and 
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court ' 
and the Judicial Council. 
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for 
the Supreme Court. 1988 
78-2a-3. Court of Appeals jurisdict ion. i 
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all ex-: 
traordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:'v 
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and de-
crees; or ,J 
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction. ^ 
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, includ-^ 
ing jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over: "Vi 
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings of state agencies or appeals fronH 
the district court review of informal adjudicative proceed^ 
ings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commis^J 
sion, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional < 
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire J 
483 JUDICIAL CODE 78-3-4 
and State Lands actions reviewed by the executive direc-
tor of the Department of Natural Resources, Board of Oil, 
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer; 
(b) appeals from the district court review.of: 
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political 
subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and 
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 
63-46a-12.1; 
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts; 
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in 
criminal cases, except those involving a charge of a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, 
except those involving a conviction of a first degree or 
capital felony; 
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary 
writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving 
any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting 
a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence for a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordi-
nary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of 
Pardons and Parole except in cases involving a first 
degree or capital felony; 
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic rela-
tions cases, including, but not limited to, divorce, annul-
ment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, 
adoption, and paternity; 
(i) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and 
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the 
Supreme Court. 
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by 
the vote of four judges of the court may certify to the Supreme 
Court for original appellate review and determination any 
matter over which the Court of Appeals has original appellate 
jurisdiction. 
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the require-
ments of Title 63, Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures 
Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings. 1996 
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of act ions by Supreme Court. 
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the Court of 
Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the 
Supreme Court. 1986 
78-2a-5. Locat ion of Court of Appeals . 
The Court of Appeals has its principal location in Salt Lake 
City. The Court of Appeals may perform any of its functions in 
any location within the state. 1986 
Section 
CHAPTER 3 
DISTRICT COURTS 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 
78-3-3. 
78-3-4. 
78-3-5. 
78-3-6. 
Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
Repealed. 
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly. 
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed. 
78-3-11.5. 
78-3-12. 
78-3-12.5. 
78-3-13. 
78-3-13.4. 
78-3-13.5, 
78-3-14.2. 
78-3-14.5. 
State District Court Administrative System. 
Repealed. 
Costs of system. 
Repealed. 
Transfer of court operating responsibilities — 
Facilities — Staff— Budget. 
78-3-14. Repealed. 
District court case management. 
Allocation of district court fees and forfeitures. 
Section 
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed. 
78-3-17.5. Application of savings accruing to counties. 
78-3-18. Judicial Administration Act — Short title. 
78-3-19. Purpose of act. 
78-3-20. Definitions. 
78-3-21. Judicial Council — Creation — Members — 
Terms and election — Responsibilities — 
Reports. 
78-3-21.5. Data bases for judicial boards. 
78-3-22. Presiding officer — Compensation — Duties. 
78-3-23. Administrator of the courts — Appointment — 
Qualifications — Salary. 
78-3-24. Court administrator — Powers, duties, and 
responsibilities. 
78-3-25. Assistants for administrator of the courts — 
Appointment of trial court executives. 
78-3-26. Courts to provide information and statistical 
data to administrator of the courts. 
78-3-27. Annual judicial conference. 
78-3-28. Repealed. 
78-3-29. Presiding judge —Associate presiding judge — 
Election — Term — Compensation — Powers 
— Duties. 
78-3-30. Duties of the clerk of the district court. 
78-3-31. Court commissioners — Qualifications — Ap-
pointment — Functions governed by rule. 
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed. 1971, 1981, 1988 
78-3-3. Term of judges — Vacancy. 
Judges of the district courts shall be appointed initially 
until the first general election held more than three years 
after the effective date of the appointment. Thereafter, the 
term of office for judges of the district courts is six years, and 
commences on the first Monday in January, next following the 
date of election. A judge whose term expires may serve, upon 
request of the Judicial Council, until a successor is appointed 
and qualified. 1988 
78-3-4. Jurisdiction — Appeals. 
(1) The district court has original jurisdiction in all matters 
civil and criminal, not excepted in the Utah Constitution and 
not prohibited by law. 
(2) The district court judges may issue all extraordinary 
writs and other writs necessary to carry into effect their 
orders, judgments, and decrees. 
(3) The district court has jurisdiction over matters of law-
yer discipline consistent with the rules of the Supreme Court. 
(4) The district court has jurisdiction over-all matters 
properly filed in the circuit court prior to July 1, 1996. 
(5) The district court has appellate jurisdiction to adjudi-
cate trials de novo of the judgments of the justice court and of 
the small claims department of the district court. 
(6) Appeals from the final orders, judgments, and decrees of 
the district court are under Sections 78-2-2 and 78-2a-3. 
(7) The district court has jurisdiction to review agency 
adjudicative proceedings as set forth in Title 63, Chapter 46b, 
Administrative Procedures Act, and shall comply with the 
requirements of that chapter, in its review of agency adjudi-
cative proceedings. 
(8) Notwithstanding Subsection (1), the district court has 
subject mat ter jurisdiction in class B misdemeanors, class C 
misdemeanors, infractions, and violations of ordinances only 
if: 
(a) there is no justice court with territorial jurisdiction; 
(b) the mat ter was properly filed in the circuit court 
prior to July 1, 1996; 
